Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances (Count One), distribution of a controlled substance, and possessing and providing contraband to a prison. Appellant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of seventy-eight months. Appellant appealed his conviction on Count One, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to establish a single conspiracy as charged in the indictment. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that the evidence in this case would allow a rational jury to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the single conspiracy charged in the indictment existed. View "United States v. Rios-Ortiz" on Justia Law

An investigation of gang-related drug trafficking by the FBI led to the arrest of Appellant, a key supplier of crack cocaine in his community. Defendant pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine and distribution of crack cocaine and received a thirteen-year sentence. Defendant appealed, claiming that his prior felony conviction did not warrant the career offender enhancement and that the district court erred in denying his request for resentencing and failing adequately to explain the reasons for his sentence. The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated Appellant's sentence and remanded for clarification, holding (1) the district court did not err in its application of the career offender enhancement, as Appellant's conviction for the burglary of a dwelling qualified as a crime of violence under the sentencing guidelines' residual clause; but (2) the record was insufficient to determine whether the district court applied the sentencing enhancement for knowingly or intentionally using a person who is a minor in violating 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and whether, in so doing, the court miscalculated Appellant's guidelines range. View "United States v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were United States citizens injured in a 1997 terrorist attack in Jerusalem that Hamas orchestrated. Plaintiffs sued the Islamic Republic of Iran, alleging that Iran had provided material support to Hamas and was therefore liable for the attack. Plaintiffs obtained a default judgment against Iran in 2003. Seeking to collect on that judgment, Plaintiffs moved to attach, by trustee process action in the District of Massachusetts, certain antiquities they claimed were the property of Iran but that were in the possession of Defendants, the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston (MFA) and Harvard University. The district court granted Defendants' motions to dissolve the attachments, concluding that Defendants could invoke the objects' immunity from attachment under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), and that although the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) provided a potential way around that immunity, Plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden of proving that the antiquities were attachable under that statute. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed but on narrower grounds, holding that TRIA in this case did not nullify the antiquities' immunity from execution under the FSIA. View "Rubin v. Harvard Univ." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Massachusetts residents, bought a three-dwelling in Massachusetts, financing the entire purchase price with two mortgage loans from Plaza Home Mortgage (Plaza). After the collapse of the housing market, Plaintiffs sued Plaza, alleging state common law and statutory violations in making the loans. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs' claim based on Plaza's alleged violation of the Massachusetts covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (2) Plaintiffs' claim based on a violation of the Massachusetts consumer protection was correctly dismissed as time-barred. View "Latson v. Plaza Home Mortgage, Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal arose from the behavior of Appellant, an attorney, during a case in which he made accusations against opposing counsel. After the trial in the case, the trial court held that sanctions were warranted because of the "heedless and unnecessary damage" to the other attorney's reputation. The court admonished Appellant under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b) for his conduct but did not impose any sanction beyond the admonishment itself. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admonishing Appellant for the accusations he made against opposing counsel concerning conversion, usury, and false statements. View "Balerna v. Gilberti" on Justia Law

The Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station in Massachusetts submitted an environmental impact statement (EIS) with its relicensing application in 2006. Before relicensing occurred, an earthquake and tsunami occurred off the coast of Japan, which hit the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. Less than three months later, Massachusetts moved to admit a contention and to reopen the Pilgrim record, arguing that Fukushima revealed new and significant information that the environmental impact analysis needed to address. The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board denied Massachusetts's motion. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) denied the Commonwealth's petition for review, rejecting the Commonwealth's claims that the EIS was inadequate in light of the damage to Fukushima. The Commonwealth also petitioned for review from the NRC's vote to renew the license of the Pilgrim station. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied the petition for review, holding that the NRC did not act arbitrarily or capriciously by (1) failing to require supplementation of the EIS in light of Fukushima; and (2) declining to hear Massachusetts' rulemaking petition and to complete all the post-Fukushima review before granting the license. View "Massachusetts v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty in a New York court of assaulting his wife Megan and sentenced to time served. At approximately the same time, the court entered a protection order prohibiting Defendant from approaching or communicating with Megan. Defendant later pled guilty to a statute criminalizing interstate travel with the intent to engage in conduct that transgresses a court-imposed protection order. The district court accepted the guideline calculations limned in the presentence investigation (PSI) report and imposed a top-of-the-range sentence of forty-one months. Defendant appealed his sentence, arguing that the sentencing court's two-level upward adjustment for violation of the court protection order constituted impermissible double counting because the violation of a court order was also an element of the offense of conviction. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the use in tandem of a base offense level dictated by U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual 2A6.2(a) and an upward adjustment under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual 2A6.2(b)(1)(A) did not constitute impermissible double counting. View "United States v. Fiume" on Justia Law

Defendant, an engineer for battery producer Electric Vehicles Worldwide (EVW), was convicted of submitting false invoices and conspiring to defraud the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) in connection with federal grants to develop a battery for electric mass transit. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding (1) the government's evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant intentionally submitted false or fraudulent claims or conspired to defraud the FTA; and (2) the trial court did not err in refusing to give Defendant's requested theory-of-defense jury instructions on condonation and reasonable interpretation of regulations. View "United States v. Willson" on Justia Law

In 2006, Plaintiff refinanced the mortgage on her single-family home in Massachusetts. Plaintiff's promissory note was delivered to one party (the lender) and then transferred. The mortgage itself was granted to a different entity, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), and later assigned to the foreclosing entity (Aurora). Three days before the rescheduled foreclosure, Plaintiff sued in state court seeking injunctive relief and monetary damages. Aurora removed the case to the federal district court. At issue before the court was how MERS's involvement in the chain of title impacted Aurora's authority to foreclose. The district court resolved this question in favor of Aurora, which then foreclosed on Plaintiff property. Plaintiff appealed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals held that the foreclosure here was not unlawful, as (1) in the circumstances of this case, Plaintiff had standing to contest the validity of the mortgage assignment made by MERS to Aurora; but (2) the MERS framework is faithful to the tenants of mortgage law in Massachusetts and was therefore not unlawful. View "Culhane v. Aurora Loan Servs. of Neb." on Justia Law

Pursuant to a warrant, federal agents searched Defendant, a suspected drug dealer, in his apartment in Warwick, Rhode Island, where the agents found drugs and drug paraphernalia. After Defendant consented to a search of his home in nearby Cranston, the agents found more drugs, drug paraphernalia, and firearms. After searching Defendant's car the next day, agents found even more drugs. Defendant was charged in a multicount indictment with drug and weapons defenses. Defendant unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence seized at the Warwick and Cranston locales. A jury subsequently convicted Defendant of all counts. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the district judge did not deprive Defendant of his right to choose his own counsel; (2) the judge did not abuse his discretion in finding Defendant competent for trial without first ordering a psychiatric exam; (3) Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims were not appropriate for appellate review; and (4) the judge did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a new trial. View "United States v. Maldonado" on Justia Law