Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Mark and Carol Menard appealed from a district court order dismissing their complaint for failure to state a claim and denying their motion to amend the complaint. Mark Menard (Menard) was permanently injured while crossing through a railroad freight yard. The district court ruled that his complaint against CSX Transportation, Inc. for recklessness and negligence failed to assert sufficient facts to overcome his status as a "trespasser" and thereby state a claim under Massachusetts law. The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court's judgment and remanded to allow Menard to explain to the district judge what basis he had to believe that narrow discovery was warranted for his peril-and-negligence allegation, which would prove an exception to the trespasser rule. View "Menard v. CSX Transp., Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Guatemala, applied for asylum, asserting that he had fled his native country due to political persecution. After the Department of Homeland Security began removal proceedings against him, Petitioner argued he was the victim of past political persecution and that, if returned to Guatemala, he would be subject to persecution on account of "membership of a particular social group," namely, the group of Guatemalan nationals repatriated from the United States. The immigration judge denied relief, finding that Petitioner was a credible witness but that the facts did not support his asylum application or other claims for relief. The board of immigration appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding that Petitioner's request for statutory withholding of removal necessarily failed, as Petitioner did not establish that he would be persecuted based on his "membership in a particular social group" or his "political opinion." View "Escobar v. Holder" on Justia Law

Appellant sought review of his conviction on a charge of conspiracy to collect debts by extortionate means and collection of debts by extortionate means. On appeal, Appellant claimed (1) the trial was tainted by the trial judge's rulings relating to allegations of juror taint and by supposed mistakes in the judge's instructions - or failure to give instructions - to the jury; (2) the district court erred in instructing the jury on the elements of extortionate debt collection; and (3) the district court failed sua sponte to instruct the jury to disregard a specific sidebar exchange that Appellant claimed the jury overheard. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that all of Appellant's claims failed on the merits. View "United States v. Dehertogh" on Justia Law

In this appeal from the denial of a preliminary inunction, plaintiff labor unions claimed that sections 6.007-.010 of Law 222, Puerto Rico's campaign finance law, placed an unconstitutional burden on the union's First Amendment right to engage in political speech. Both the district court and the government declined to address the merits of Plaintiffs' claims. The First Circuit Court of Appeals issued an appellate injunction enjoining enforcement of the challenged provisions of Law 222 pending the final disposition of this appeal. In this opinion the First Circuit outlined the reasons it ordered entry of the appellate injunction, holding, among other things, that it was incumbent upon the district court to engage with the merits of Plaintiffs' claims. The Court also ordered the district court to enter a preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of certain sections of the law. View "Puertorriqueno v. Fortuno" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Jamaica, was convicted of illicit trafficking - an aggravated felony - and also of an offense under a state law relating to a controlled substance. The Department of Homeland Security began removal proceedings against Petitioner based on these offenses. Petitioner filed a responsive pleading seeking to terminate the removal proceedings or, in the alternative, to cancel removal. An immigration judge (IJ) denied Petitioner's motion to terminate and ordered Petitioner to be removed to Jamaica. The board of immigration appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding that Petitioner pled to possessing a controlled substance with intent to sell in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. 21a-277(b), that the offense was a subordinate offense constituting "trafficking," and therefore, Petitioner was convicted of drug trafficking as defined by federal law. View "James v. Holder" on Justia Law

In 2010, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) began removal proceedings under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) against Petitioner. The notice asserted that Petitioner was removable on three separate grounds - child abuse, crime of violence, and sexual abuse of a minor. An immigration judge (IJ) ruled that Petitioner was removable on all three grounds asserted by DHS, and that, as an aggravated felon, Petitioner was ineligible for cancellation of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. At issue was whether the endangerment offense to which Petitioner pled nolo contendere comprised an aggravated felony sexual abuse offense for purposes of the INA. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the BIA's ruling insofar as it held that Petitioner was removable on the grounds that he was convicted of aggravated felony sexual abuse and that he was therefore ineligible for cancellation of removal, as Petitioner could not be held to have pled to an offense that fell within the sexual abuse rubric under the INA. View "Campbell v. Holder" on Justia Law

The parties in this case were competing financial institutions operating in Puerto Rico. Plaintiffs (collectively, "Oriental") had for many years used the ORIENTAL mark in connection with advertising, promotion, and offering of financial services in Puerto Rico. Oriental contended that beginning around 2009, Defendant ("Cooperativa") used a confusingly similar mark, COOP ORIENTAL, and a confusingly similar logo containing that mark in connection with its financial business and services, in violation of the Lanham Act and Puerto Rico trademark law. Finding a likelihood of confusion, the district court ordered Cooperativa to cease all use of its new logo (which used the COOP ORIENTAL mark with an orange trade dress) but allowed Cooperativa to revert back to using its pre-2009 logo (also containing the COOP ORIENTAL mark, but with a different trade dress). On appeal, Oriental contended that the court's injunction should have been broader to include any use of the COOP ORIENTAL mark and similar marks. The First Circuit Court of Appeals remanded to the district court to determine whether there was a likelihood of confusion as to the COOP ORIENTAL mark and other marks and whether the injunction should be broader. View "Oriental Fin. Group, Inc. v. Cooperativa de Ahorro y Credito Oriental" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted for traveling in interstate commerce and then knowingly failing to update his sex offender registration at his destination as required by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). The district court sentenced Appellant to thirty-five months' imprisonment consecutive to his state sentence for violating probation by failing to update his Massachusetts sex offender registration. Appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing, inter alia, that SORNA's registration requirements impermissibly increased his punishment for his earlier sexual offenses. SORNA was enacted in 2006. Appellant's previous offenses took place in 1990 and 1996. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) SORNA does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause; (2) SORNA does not reach beyond the limits of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause; (3) SORNA as applied to Appellant did not violate Appellant's due process rights; and (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to make Appellant's sentence consecutive to, rather than concurrent with, his thirty-month sentence. View "United States v. Parks" on Justia Law

Appellant entered a guilty plea to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute various controlled substances, including crack cocaine, and conspiracy to possess firearms in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. On July 27, 2010, the district court sentenced Appellant to a 150-month incarcerative term. On August 3, 2010, Congress enacted the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA), which gave the Sentencing Commission emergency authority to lower the guideline penalties for crack cocaine offenses. The Commission promulgated the new guideline amendments, which ensured that the lowered guideline ranges would for the most part be available for retroactive application. In anticipation of the November 1, 2011 effective date, Appellant filed a motion for a sentence reduction. The district court declined to reduce the sentence "in the exercise of its discretion." The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the catalogued factors plainly indicated that the court gave individualized consideration to Appellant's situation and had specific - and not unreasonable - grounds for denying a sentence reduction. View "United States v. Aponte-Guzman" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted after a jury trial of producing, and aiding and abetting in the production of, a visual depiction of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct using materials mailed, shipped, or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. Defendant appealed, asserting that the Government's proof as to the crime's jurisdictional element - i.e, that the materials were part of foreign or interstate commerce - rested on inadmissible hearsay, which violated his right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. Defendant argued that the testimony of the Government's witness regarding the origin of a hard drive and webcam constituted inadmissible hearsay because it relied on statements contained in the labels affixed to the same. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction, holding that the trial court did not plainly err in admitting the disputed testimony, as the witness could have relied on his own expert knowledge rather than the labels in forming an opinion about the objects' origin. View "United States v. Acevedo-Maldonado" on Justia Law