Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellant was convicted in the United States district court for his role in a scheme to illegally obtain and distribute prescription drugs. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the district court erred in allowing testimony about the guilty pleas of Appellant's former co-defendants, but the error was harmless; and (2) in determining the appropriate sentence within the United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG), or in varying guidelines, a sentencing court has discretion to consider the defendant's cooperation with the government as an 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factor, even if the government has not made a USSG 5K1.1 motion for a downward departure. View "United States v. Landron-Class" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of conspiracy to commit kidnapping and conspiracy to use interstate commerce facilities in the commission of murder for hire. Appellant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment on the grounds of outrageous government misconduct in manufacturing federal jurisdiction and in refusing to instruct the jury on the defense of jurisdictional entrapment. Both arguments depended on the contention that the government created United States jurisdiction by unlawfully orchestrating a change in location for the crimes that Appellant conspired to commit. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) without evidence that Appellant was coerced or unduly induced, or evidence that the government engaged in some other type of outrageous misconduct, the district court did nor err by denying Appellant's motion to dismiss; and (2) as Appellant plainly failed to satisfy his burden to make a threshold showing of inducement, the district court did not err in refusing to give Appellant's proposed jurisdictional entrapment jury instruction. View "United States v. Djokich" on Justia Law

Developer and Tenant had done business for many years and had established a template for future transactions. A dispute arose when Tenant forwarded to Developer a commercial lease containing a material term that deviated from the parties' previous leases without specifically drawing Developer's attention to the change. Developer signed the lease without reading the proffered lease line by line. Years later, when Developer discovered the new term, it filed suit against Tenant. The district court, without passing on the merits of the dispute, entered summary judgment against Developer on the ground that the action was time-barred. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court appropriately determined that Developer's action was brought too late. View "Rared Manchester NH, LLC v. Rite Aid of N.H., Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the forty-six-month sentence imposed following his guilty plea conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm in connection with his shipping an assault rifle and pistol from Florida to Puerto Rico. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the sentence, where (1) the district court's application of an upward departure was reasonable; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in choosing how far to enhance the sentence; and (3) the district court did not fail to balance the relevant mitigating factors. View "United States v. Lozada-Aponte" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from entry of summary judgment against his claims of race-based disparate treatment and of hostile work environment against Employer. Plaintiff's complaint alleged Employer punished him more harshly for a rules violation, on the basis of his Hispanic heritage, than it did a similarly situated white co-worker and permitted other employees to harass him in violation of Title VII. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that summary judgment was appropriate on both of Plaintiff's claims, as (1) Employer's reasons for disciplining Plaintiff, on the record, did not allow inferences or pretext or discrimination, and there was no differential treatment; and (2) Employer took reasonable steps to address the alleged co-worker harassment. View "Espinal v. Nat'l Grid NE Holdings 2, LLC " on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted for illegally trafficking in sperm whale teeth and narwhal tusks. Specifically, the jury found Defendant's whale-tooth dealings violated CITES, an international compact implemented in the United States via the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and regulations authorized by the ESA. Defendant appealed, contending (1) the district judge should have instructed the jury on certain lesser-included offenses because he did not actually know his transactions were illegal, even if he should have known; and (2) smuggling convictions are legally wrong because his conduct violated only regulations, not statutes. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed after quoting a line from Moby Dick, holding (1) the district court did not err in failing to give the requested instructions because a rational jury could not have found that Defendant lacked actual knowledge that his whale-tooth transactions were illegal; and (2) the smuggling statute criminalizes violations of regulations like those implementing CITES because Congress intended the word "law" in the phrase "contrary to law" to include regulatory law as well as statutory law. View "United States v. Place" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to firearms charges in three cases. The district court, at a consolidated hearing, subsequently sentenced Defendant to a total term of imprisonment of seventy-two months. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by failing to comply with 18 U.S.C. 3584(b), which requires a court to consider the statutory sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) when deciding whether multiple sentences of imprisonment will be served concurrently or consecutively. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the sentences, holding that the district court did consider the statutory sentencing factors when it imposed a consecutive sentence even though the court did not specifically reference the factors that Appellant highlighted. View "United States v. Maldonado-Escarfullery" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned the implementation of a federally-assisted Medicaid program by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, represented by its Secretary of Health. This was the sixth time the First Circuit Court of Appeals considered issues related to a dispute between the Commonwealth and several federally qualified health centers (FQHCs). The FQHCs here took to federal courts their claims for reimbursement payments owed to them under the Medicaid program. The district court, among other things, set a formula in place by way of a preliminary injunction that calculated payments the Commonwealth owed the FQHCs for providing Medicaid services. The First Circuit (1) concluded the formula that the district court endorsed in its preliminary injunction was not sufficiently supported by the factual record, and therefore, the Court remanded for further reformulation; (2) affirmed the district court's denial of the FQHCs' request for indemnification from debts owed to third party managed care organizations; and (3) affirmed the district court's determination that the Eleventh Amendment precludes a federal court from imposing a judgment for money damages upon the Commonwealth to make payments for periods predating the date of the district court's preliminary injunction. View "Consejo de Salud De La Communidad de Playa de Ponce, Inc. v. Gonzalez-Feliciano" on Justia Law

Alas, a citizen of El Salvador, unlawfully entered the U.S. in 2003. In 2006, the Department of Homeland Security began removal proceedings, charging Alas with removability as an alien present without being admitted or paroled, and for being present in the without a valid immigrant visa, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(I); 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). He requested political asylum and withholding of removal. The IJ found that his testimony about gang threats and the murder of family members was credible, but that the application for political asylum was untimely and that his explanations for the untimely application were inadequate. The IJ also found that Alas was not a victim of past persecution and had not met his burden of showing persecution, a well-founded fear of persecution, or a clear probability of persecution on account of a statutorily protected ground. Alas did not establish himself to be a member of a particular social group and his fear of harm was not centrally based upon an actual or implied protected ground. The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit denied a petition for review. View "Beltrand-Alas v. Holder" on Justia Law

Sumrall pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute over five grams of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B). The government sought to invoke the career offender guideline, USSG 4B1.1(a), which applies where the "offense of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense" and the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions for controlled substance offenses or crimes of violence. A "crime of violence" is any offense punishable by more than one year of imprisonment that either "(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or (2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another." Sumrall has a prior felony conviction for armed robbery and a prior conviction for assault and battery on a police officer, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, sect. 13D. The district court used the career offender guideline and sentenced Sumrall to 188 months in prison. The First Circuit affirmed. Assault and battery on a police officer under the Massachusetts statute is categorically a crime of violence. View "United States v. Sumrall" on Justia Law