Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in July, 2012
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Fernandes injured his back when he stepped into a hole in the floor of a tire "shed," an old shipping container, which was on property leased by AGAR to Fernandes's employer, Penske Truck Leasing. He sued AGAR on the theory that it owed him a duty of care to maintain and repair the tire shed under the lease. The district court granted summary judgment to AGAR under Massachusetts law. The First Circuit affirmed, finding that, under the lease, Agar had no duty to repair or maintain the shed. View "Fernandes v. Agar Supply Co., Inc." on Justia Law

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Customs and Border Patrol agents stopped petitioner at a New Hampshire checkpoint. She failed to produce valid immigration documents and CBP charged her as a removable alien present in the U.S. without having been admitted or paroled, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). More than a year later, she applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture protection, claiming that, while living in Colombia, she was on a public bus that was attacked by the Colombian FARC guerillas, who killed five passengers. Petitioner claims to fear that harm to her and her family if she returns to Colombia. During one of several hearings, the IJ directed her to submit a declaration or any documentation detailing her entry into the U.S. and to request fingerprinting. The IJ granted a continuance of over a year. Both petitioner and her counsel failed to comply with any of the outstanding directives by the time for hearing on the merits. Counsel conceded that petitioner had not filed for asylum within the one-year time limit and provided no explanation as to why an exception might apply. The IJ dismissed her claims as abandoned, for failure to comply with outstanding orders. The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit denied review. View "Gomez-Medina v. Holder" on Justia Law

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Carta pled guilty to child pornography in 2002 and was sentenced to five years in prison and three years of supervised release. Prior to his scheduled release, the Bureau of Prisons certified that Carta was a "sexually dangerous person" and commenced civil commitment proceedings under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, 18 U.S.C. 4248(a). A "sexually dangerous person" is one "who has engaged or attempted to engage in sexually violent conduct or child molestation and is sexually dangerous to others." A determination that an individual is a sexually dangerous person requires proof by clear and convincing evidence that he "suffers from a serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder as a result of which he would have serious difficulty in refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation if released." After a district judge ruled that the government had failed to establish that Carta's diagnosis of "paraphilia not otherwise specified characterized by hebephilia" was a "serious mental illness, abnormality or disorder" under the Act, the First Circuit reversed. A different district court judge subsequently ruled in the government's favor. The First Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Carta" on Justia Law

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Crooker was charged with possession of firearms and ammunition by an unlawful user of a controlled substance, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(3), and possession of marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 844. He was convicted of possession of marijuana and fined $4000. The First Circuit affirmed, upholding the district court's denial of a motion to suppress statements and evidence recovered during the search of the residence where he lived with his parents and brothers. Given the familiarity of the surroundings in which Crooker was questioned, the calm and peaceable nature of the conversations, and the lack of physical restraint or show of force during questioning, Crooker was not in custody for Miranda purposes. In light of secretive conversations between Crooker’s father and uncle about the biological toxin ricin, their discussion about moving the uncle’s possessions while the uncle was incarcerated, and information provided by confidential informants, including information that the uncle had buried ricin in Crooker's backyard, there was probable cause to believe that evidence of the enumerated crimes would be found at Crooker's house. View "United States v. Crooker" on Justia Law

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Massachusetts Trooper Patterson, undercover, placed a phone call requesting two $40 bags of crack cocaine and waited for delivery in a truck equipped with concealed audio/video recording equipment. From across the street, Patterson could see people congregated around a driveway; a man left the group and walked toward Patterson's truck. Patterson watched the man carefully, to be sure he was unarmed, and later described his clothing in detail. Patterson told the man that he wanted two bags of crack. The man then went back to the group, got into a car and left. Shortly thereafter, a second unidentified man left the group, went to the truck and sold a bag that proved to contain crack cocaine. Using a video recording, another officer recognized the first man as Jones and the second as Richmond (who later pled guilty). Patterson identified photos of each. In Jones’s trial on conspiring to distribute cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 846, and abetting distribution, 18 U.S.C. 2 of cocaine base within 1,000 feet of a school, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 860, the court refused to exclude the identification , but excluded a proposed defense expert to testify about issues related to eyewitness identification. Jones was convicted. The First Circuit affirmed.View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

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In a suit alleging engine defects in Volkswagen and Audi vehicles, the district court awarded $30 million in attorneys' fees to several groups of plaintiffs' attorneys who achieved a class action settlement agreement. The award was based in federal law. The First Circuit vacated the fee award and remanded for calculation using Massachusetts law. In a diversity suit, where the settlement agreement expressly states that the parties have not agreed on the source of law to apply to the fee award and there is an agreement that the defendants will pay reasonable fees, state law governs the fee award. View "Volkswagen Grp of Am. v. McNulty Law Firm" on Justia Law

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Venti’s father received federal Civil Service Retirement System benefits. Venti’s father died in 1990, which should have terminated his benefits. The Office of Personnel Management continued to deposit the CSRS funds into a checking account that Venti had shared with his father. In 2003, Venti opened a new joint checking account at RFCU in the names of himself and his father and arranged for the CSRS benefits, as well as his own Social Security benefits, to be deposited in the new account. In 2005, OPM learned of the death of Venti's father and stopped depositing the CSRS benefits. In 2009, Venti was convicted of theft of government property (18 U.S.C. 641), one count for each of nine checks written in his father’s name during 2005, and was sentenced to 15 months. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that one count was time-barred. If the count had been time-barred, the sentence would have been limited to one year because Venti would be treated as a misdemeanant rather than as a felon. View "United States v. Venti" on Justia Law

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Alvarado began working for the U.S. Postal Service in 1991. His recurrent schizoaffective disorder was first diagnosed in 1992. According to Alvarado, the medication made him drowsy and slowed his work pace, at times making him late with his mail delivery, but made him able to perform competently. Alvarado claims to have been subjected to harassment and discrimination after he told his superiors of his medical condition. He complained to the Equal Employment Opportunity office. In time, Alvarado ran into problems relating to his work performance, particularly his slow work pace. At one point he was suspended for 14 days for improper conduct and delay of mail. Later, when he returned to the USPS branch at approximately 6:00 PM after completing his delivery route and found it closed, he felt anxious and humiliated, did not return to work, and officially resigned his post. Since his resignation, Alvarado has been found permanently disabled and eligible for disability benefits. Alvarado exhausted EEO administrative proceedings. The district court dismissed his suit under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 791. The First Circuit affirmed.View "Alvarado v. Potter" on Justia Law

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Taxpayers bought and renovated a $1,050,000 row house in the South End of Boston, subject to historic preservation restrictions. In 2003, they learned about a tax incentive program for historic preservation, promoted by National Architectural Trust, which advised them that the Trust could help them qualify for a deduction of 10 to 15 percent of fair market value. Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. 170(h), creates an incentive for donation of property interests to nonprofit organizations and government entities for "conservation purposes," including preservation of "historically important" land or structures. Taxpayers made a $1,000 deposit, executed a Preservation Restriction Agreement, and sent another $15,840. On their 2003 return they claimed a cash contribution of $16,870 to the Trust and a noncash contribution of $220,800 for the easement donation (spread to 2004 return). In 2009, the IRS sent "Notice of Deficiency" and calculated that they owed an additional $39,081.25 for 2003 and an additional $36,340.00 for 2004, plus underpayment penalties. The Tax Court disallowed any deduction for the easement, but held that they were entitled to deduct their $16,840 cash contribution on their 2004 return. The First Circuit vacated and remanded, rejecting the reasoning for disallowing the deduction for the easement. View "Kaufman v. Shulman" on Justia Law

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Gove worked for TDC, which had a contract with Loring. TDC employees were informed that CSD had been awarded the Loring contract and would be providing services previously furnished by TDC. Gove applied online for a CSD position, similar to the one that she held with TDC. The application included a provision that any dispute with respect to any issue prior to employment, arising out of the employment process, would resolved in accord with the Dispute Resolution Policy and Arbitration Agreement adopted by CSD for its employees. When Gove was interviewed by CSD, she was visibly pregnant and was asked whether she had other children. Gove was not hired, although CSD continued to have a need for the position and continued to advertise the position. Gove filed a complaint with the Maine Human Rights Commission, which found reasonable grounds, but was unable to persuade the parties to reach agreement. She sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and the Maine Human Rights Act. CSD moved to compel arbitration. The district court found that the arbitration clause was ambiguous as to whether it covered an applicant who was never hired and should be construed against CSD. The First Circuit affirmed. View "Gove v. Career Sys. Dev. Corp." on Justia Law