Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was a police officer with the Puerto Rico police force from 1991 until September 2007, shortly after he was indicted on charges of conspiracy to engage in robberies (Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a)). At his trial, the government put on evidence sufficient to prove that defendant participated in one of five robberies. On August 7, 2002, he assisted in the robbery of a private security firm's payroll by loaning the robbers his personal firearm and by driving a getaway car. He received $7,500. The First Circuit reversed. Even if there was sufficient evidence to convict him of conspiring to commit the payroll robbery of August 7, 2002, there was not legally sufficient evidence to convict him of participating in the charged broader multiple-robbery conspiracy, much less one that included the next and final robbery of September 25, 2002. His conviction for the August 7 robbery was barred by the five-year statute of limitations for non-capital federal crimes, 18 U.S.C. 3282(a). The government was two weeks too late in indicting him on August 22, 2007. View "United States v. Franco-Santiago" on Justia Law

Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. 7, denies federal economic and other benefits to same-sex couples lawfully married in Massachusetts and to surviving spouses from those couples, by defining "marriage" as "only a legal union between one man and one woman." "Spouse" refers "only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife." DOMA absolves states from recognizing same-sex marriages solemnized in other states; prevents same-sex married couples from filing joint federal tax returns, affecting tax burdens; prevents a surviving same-sex spouse from collecting Social Security survivor benefits; leaves federal employees unable to share health insurance and other benefits with same-sex spouses. DOMA may result in loss of federal funding of programs such as Medicaid and veterans cemeteries if states recognize same-sex marriages in determining income or allowing burials. The district court declared Section 3 unconstitutional. The First Circuit affirmed, but stayed injunctive relief, anticipating certiorari review. The court applied "a closer than usual review" based on discrepant impact among married couples and on the importance of state interests in regulating marriage and tested the rationales for DOMA, considering Supreme Court precedent limiting which rationales can be counted and the force of certain rationales. View "Commonwealth v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

In 2001 the Hotel hired plaintiff as a casino worker. Approximately six years into his employment, he filed a charge of sex and age discrimination with the EEOC. In his complaint under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623(d), and Puerto Rico law, he alleges that, shortly after he made these filings, his supervisors embarked on a pattern of retaliation ultimately resulting in his dismissal. He filed a retaliation charge with the EEOC, which issued a right-to-sue letter. Citing two agreements signed by plaintiff, each containing an arbitration clause, the Hotel moved to compel arbitration. Plaintiff argued that the agreements he had signed impermissibly shorten the limitations period, impede public enforcement of antidiscrimination laws, and unduly burden workers' rights. The district court determined that the arbitration clauses were valid and dismissed without prejudice. The First Circuit affirmed, citing the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1-16, and holding that the arbitrator can determine whether Puerto Rico law permits shortening of the limitations period. View "Escobar-Noble v. Ritz-Carlton Hotel" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Moldova, was admitted to the U.S. in on a non-immigrant cultural exchange visa. 2006. Instead of departing, he applied for asylum, citing his Roma descent and his membership in Moldova's pro-democratic political party. An Immigration Judge found petitioner's hearing testimony generally credible, considered the most recent State Department country conditions report, but found that petitioner had not carried his burden of proving past persecution or well-founded fear of future persecution on account of a statutorily protected ground, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42)(A). The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit denied an appeal. View "Gilca v. Holder" on Justia Law

The trooper saw a minivan with what appeared to be a glinting blue light, like those mounted behind the windshields of police cars. Because Maine law prohibits such lights on civilian vehicles, the trooper gave chase with his siren going. The driver continued on for 39 seconds, making unusual motions. The trooper saw a television screen attached to the windshield by a large blue suction cup and a blue placard on the rearview mirror. The driver was talking on a cell phone, and, asked about his furtive motions, said he had dropped the phone, picked it up, and called his wife; he claimed to have left his license and registration at home. He gave a false name, which did not match computerized records, and eventually admitted that he did not have a valid license. Arrested, he refused to be fingerprinted. The officer was applying for a search warrant when the driver admitted that he was wanted for kidnapping. A pistol, ammunition, and marijuana were found in the van. He entered a conditional plea of guilty to being a felon in possession, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and was sentenced to 36 months The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to denial of a motion to suppress and to the sentence. View "United States v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

In consolidated negligence actions under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. 51, against two railroad defendants, a former employee, alleged cumulative, or wear-out, injuries to the neck, knees, left elbow and thumb, and accidental injury to the left forearm while driving a spike. The district court entered judgment for defendants. The First Circuit affirmed. The aggravation claims were untimely, and no fact-finder could reasonably have inferred that plaintiff became aware of a work connection with his knee pain and neck injury only after mid-September of 2004. The court rejected claims based in negligence, alleging inadequate tools and failure to obtain ergonomic studies of the activities required to perform plaintiff’s jobs and upheld admission of evidence of malingering. View "Crowther v. CSX Transp., Inc." on Justia Law

Oxford contracted with Airlarr, to work on Airlarr's airplane at an estimated cost close to $70,000. The work was complete in 2007 and, in 2010, Airlarr sued for breach of contract, breach of express and implied warranties, and state-law claims. The complaint alleged that a window cracked during the flight home and listed various defects: uncomfortable seats, leaking fuel injectors, a cracked turbocharger, and improperly installed carpet. Oxford notified Global, which had issued Oxford a commercial general liability and requested that Global defend it. Global disclaimed both coverage and duty to defend. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Global. The First Circuit vacated with respect to duty to defend. Duty to defend is ordinarily broader than its duty to indemnify. In Maine, the insurer must defend if the claims in the complaint create even a remote possibility of coverage. If Airlarr proves its case, there will likely be little indemnification since most of the claimed injuries appear to be covered by exclusions, but the duty to defend is triggered by any realistic possibility of any damage that might be within coverage and outside the exclusions and the damaged window creates that prospect. View "Oxford Aviation, Inc. v. Global Aerospace, Inc." on Justia Law

A worker, injured at a construction site while working for a subcontractor, sued the developer. The developer submitted the claim to the insurer, which obtained a declaratory judgment that it was not required to indemnify or defend. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that a Contractors Exclusion clause was unambiguous and precluded coverage for any injuries arising out of operations performed for the insured by independent contractors. View "Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. Stolberg" on Justia Law

A grower, having sold table grapes to defendant, obtained a reparation order of about $ 70,000 under the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act of 1930, 7 U.S.C. 499a. The district court dismissed an appeal for failure to file the bond required by the Act. The First Circuit affirmed. View "Alphas Co., Inc. v. Dan Tudor & Sons Sales, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute one or more kilograms of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841, 846, and conspiracy to import one or more kilograms of heroin into the U.S., 21 U.S.C. 952(a),963, and was sentenced to 210 months' imprisonment. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the district court erred in: denying a motion to dismiss pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act; making inappropriate comments during trial and providing the jury with misleading instructions; permitting the government to present inadmissible hearsay and improper overview testimony; allowing a government fact witness to render expert testimony without the requisite qualification and advance notice; denying multiple requests to suppress foreign wiretap evidence; and improperly applying the guidelines during sentencing. View "United States v. Valdivia" on Justia Law