Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in April, 2012
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Aresty International Law Firm deposited a check for $197,750.00 from a Citibank-held account into a Citizens Bank-held account, received clearance to transfer the funds from Citizens, and instructed Citizens to wire the funds from the account. Citizens did so, only to find later that the check had been fraudulent. Citizens sued Aresty and obtained a judgment slightly less than the amount of the check. Aresty sought to hold Citibank liable for the lost funds because of its alleged failure to abide by certain provisions of federal and state law. The district court dismissed the federal came as untimely and not subject to equitable tolling and found the state claim preempted by federal law. The First Circuit affirmed. Acknowledging that the sophisticated scam is difficult to detect until it is too late, the court stated that Aresty, nonetheless, “sat on its metaphorical hands” for 21 months past the date when it discovered its potential liability for the wired funds, so that equitable tolling cannot save its claim under Regulation CC (Expedited Funds Availability Act, 12 U.S.C. 4001-4010). View "Aresty Int'l Law Firm, P.C. v. Citibank, N.A." on Justia Law

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Puerto Rico has classified Coors as a large brewer under its beer tax schedule, taxed at a higher rate than small brewers, including local brewer Cervecería India. In 2006, Coors brought suit challenging this differential treatment under the dormant Commerce Clause. The district court originally dismissed the case on comity grounds, but the First Circuit reversed. While remand was pending in 2010, the Supreme Court decided Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., which expressly abrogated the First Circuit’s 2009 decision. The district court then dismissed on grounds of comity. The First Circuit affirmed. Puerto Rico’s Secretary of the Treasury did not consent to litigate in federal court and Puerto Rico courts provide an adequate state forum for adjudication of federal constitutional claims. View "Coors Brewing Co. v. Mendez-Torres" on Justia Law

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Defendant, convicted of first degree murder in Massachusetts, exhausted state appeals. No physical evidence linked him to the crime, but circumstantial evidence included his threats to kill the victim, testimony that the victim was last seen getting into a car with defendant, and defendant’s statements indicating guilt. The district court rejected his habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition, which was based on an argument that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court applied a beyond a reasonable doubt standard contrary to that articulated by the Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), in evaluating his claim that there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to support his conviction or incorrectly applied the correct standard. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction. View "Morgan v. Pepe" on Justia Law

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Petitioner, a citizen of Cambodia, entered the U.S. on a non-immigrant visitor visa, overstayed, and timely applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. An immigration judge denied relief. The BIA dismissed. The First Circuit vacated and remanded. The court applied the law concerning corroboration as it existed before passage of the REAL ID Act of 2005, 119 Stat. 302 and noted that the corroboration identified by the IJ as lacking "is far from typical." A letter from the U.S. government to support petitioner's claim that he provided information to the government at risk to himself might be inaccessible. The IJ made no findings concerning the reasonableness of the requirement or petitioner's inability to produce such corroboration. View "Soeung v. Holder" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs are a dissident group, within a larger class of medical patient consumers in a case alleging fraud in overcharging for the medication Lupron. The patients, along with insurers and private health care providers, obtained a $150 million settlement agreement that was approved by the district court, of which $40 million was allocated to consumers. That agreement provided that if there were unclaimed monies from the $40 million consumer settlement pool after full recovery to consumer plaintiffs, all unclaimed funds would go into a cy pres fund to be distributed at the discretion of the trial judge. Dissident plaintiffs appealed distribution of the $11.4 million cy pres fund to the Dana Farber/Harvard Cancer Center and the Prostate Cancer Foundation for work on the treatment of the diseases for which Lupron is prescribed. They have already recovered more than 100% of their actual damages. The First Circuit affirmed. After expressing concern about distribution of such funds by judges and adding an audit requirement, the court noted the importance of avoiding windfalls for plaintiffs who have already been fully compensated. View "Rohn v. Dana Farber/Harvard Cancer Ctr." on Justia Law

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Named plaintiffs sought to represent potential classes of hospital employees, some covered by collective bargaining agreements and others not, claiming that they were deprived of compensation for work performed during meal breaks, before and after shifts, and during training sessions. One case asserted only state law tort and regulatory claims; the other raised claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 206-207, and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C.1059(a)(1), 1104(a)(1). The district court dismissed. The First Circuit affirmed in part. The state law claims were properly removed to federal court and were preempted because many were dependent on the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. The federal law claims, dismissed for failure to identify specific employers, were remanded to permit amendment. View "Cavallaro v. UMass Mem'l Health Care,Inc." on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs, seeking to represent a class, alleged failure to compensate them for work performed during their meal break and before and after shifts, and for time spent attending training sessions, in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 206-207; the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1059(a)(1), 1104(a)(1); and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1962, 1964(c). The district court held that the FLSA claim was deficiently pled, and that this was fatal to the complaint because the ERISA and RICO claims were derivative of the FLSA claim. The court found the allegation of under-compensation insufficient, given the lack of any information on plaintiffs' approximate weekly wages and hours worked, or even an allegation that they had worked in excess of 40 hours in any workweek. The First Circuit vacated. The allegations were insufficient under the FLSA, but plaintiffs should be permitted to amend. View "Pruell v. Caritas Christi" on Justia Law

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While engaged in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy action, the debtor brought claims against government officials and a police officer, seeking damages for an allegedly illegal search of his property. He did not amend his bankruptcy schedules, as required, to disclose the existence of his claims as newly acquired assets prior to obtaining a discharge from bankruptcy. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the government defendants, on the basis of judicial estoppel. Although failure to disclose his claims did not give debtor an unfair advantage in the civil proceeding, he had successfully adopted a position in the bankruptcy proceeding inconsistent with the position he took in the damages claim. The First Circuit affirmed. To allow debtor to rely on a belated report of the claims, which he had repeatedly denied, "would neither serve the equities of this case nor create the proper incentive for future debtors to disclose assets in a bankruptcy proceeding completely and accurately."View "Guay v. Burack" on Justia Law

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For 20 years, George was a clerk-magistrate. In 1995, he was charged with conspiracy to commit honest-services wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 371, 1343, 1346 for selling blank search warrants, used to commit robberies. George entered a plea for a sentence of 20 months and a $10,000 fine. George retired before his plea and began receiving a monthly benefit of $1,424.91, plus health-care. In 2003, the state retirement board suspended benefits; his attorney had advised him that he would remain eligible if he started receiving benefits before he entered a plea. The district court denied his petition for a writ of error coram nobis. The First Circuit affirmed. The Board authorized recoupment of benefits in excess of contributions. In 2010, the Supreme Court held that "intangible right of honest services," in 18 U.S.C. 1346, would be unconstitutionally vague unless limited to schemes involving bribes or kickbacks. George’s second petition was denied. The court found that, in light of Skilling, a fundamental error had occurred, but that cessation of benefits did not constitute a continuing collateral consequence sufficient to justify the remedy. The First Circuit affirmed, referring to a “Hail Mary pass.” A court has discretion to withhold the remedy where the interests of justice dictate.View "United States v. George" on Justia Law

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Valerio, a citizen of Costa Rica, entered the U.S. illegally in 1991. Her companion paid $500 to obtain a birth certificate and Social Security card in the name of Rosa Hernandez, a person living in Puerto Rico. For about 12 years, Valerio used Hernandez's identity to hold a variety of jobs, pay taxes, open lines of credit, purchase cars, obtain a drivers' license, and take a loan to purchase a home. She obtained various welfare benefits for herself and her family under her real name, withholding information regarding income and assets she held under Hernandez's name. She used the Hernandez identity to vouch for herself as Valerio. When the real Hernandez discovered the situation, police apprehended Valerio, searched her apartment, and found numerous documents relating to her true identity and her assumed Hernandez identity. She was convicted of three counts of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341 and aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028A. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to sufficiency of the evidence and holding that Valerio was not prejudiced by the performance of her trial attorney.View "United States v. Valerio" on Justia Law