Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After running from police, defendant was arrested and convicted of possessing an unregistered short-barreled shotgun in violation of the National Firearms Act. 26 U.S.C. 5861(d), 5871. He appealed, arguing that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence that he knew the shotgun barrel was shorter than 18 inches, the statutory characteristic subjecting the weapon to the Act. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that a reasonable jury could conclude that defendant, a man familiar with guns, was aware of the type of weapon he possessed. View "United States v. Shaw" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a plea of guilty to 17 counts of transportation, distribution, and possession of child pornography, through use of the internet. The First Circuit rejected his appeal of denial of a motion to suppress. The search warrant was adequate despite the fact that the IP address defendant used to accomplish his crimes was a "dynamic" and not a "static" one. The court also affirmed an order of $3,800 restitution under 18 U.S.C. 2259 to a victim, who was a minor when her father created the pornographic videos circulated by defendant.View "United States v. Kearney" on Justia Law

For 30 years, GE manufactured electric capacitors containing Pyranol, an insulation containing PCBs and stored scrap in drums. It sold the scrap to Fletcher, who used it as a paint additive. Fletcher purchased more than 200,000 gallons of GE's scrap Pyranol until 1967. After failing to pay for 14 shipments, Fletcher proposed that GE retrieve the drums. GE did not follow up. In 1987, EPA found hundreds of unmarked drums containing scrap Pyranol at the Fletcher Site. Several had leaked. EPA installed a temporary cap, added the site to the Superfund List, and sought to recover costs under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(3). A 1994 consent decree stipulated that GE would pay costs incurred through April, 1993. GE did not concede liability. In 2006, the government sought recovery for post-1993 costs. The First Circuit affirmed the district court's entry of judgment for the government on "arranger" liability. GE was aware that Fletcher had drums that would not be used and made no effort to deal with it. The court also rejected a statute of limitations defense. View "United States v. Gen. Elec. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Rhode Island resident and employee of Safety, a Massachusetts corporation, was driving one of Safety's vehicles in Massachusetts as part of her job and was seriously injured in an accident caused by the other driver. She filed a claim against the tortfeasor, whose insurer paid the full policy limit of $20,000.00. She also received workers' compensation through the Rhode Island system and settled a Underinsured Motorist claim against her personal automobile insurance company for the policy limit of $25,000.00. She sought to recover under the UIM provision of Safety's policy, provided by defendant. The First Circuit determined that Massachusetts law applied, under which an employee cannot recover under both WC and her employer's UIM policy, except where the employer has "explicitly purchased" the UIM coverage for employees injured in the course of their employment. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment to defendant. The First Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff had no evidence that the company explicitly purchased the coverage for employees injured in the course of employment that would permit a reasonable jury to resolve this case in her favor. View "Baker v. St. Paul Travelers Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Defendant sells brokerage and investment products and services, typically to registered broker-dealers and investment advisers that trade securities for clients. One of its services, NetExchange Pro, an interface for research and managing brokerage accounts via the Internet, can be used for remote access to market dynamics and customer accounts. A firm may make its clients' personal information, including social security numbers and taxpayer identification numbers, accessible to end-users in NetExchange Pro. Some of defendant's employees also have access to this information. Plaintiff, a brokerage customer with NPC, which made its customer account information accessible in NetExchange Pro, received notice of the company's policy and filed a putative class action, alleging breach of contract, breach of implied contract, negligent breach of contractual duties, and violations of Massachusetts consumer protection laws. The district court dismissed. The First Circuit affirmed. Despite "dire forebodings" about access to personal information, plaintiff failed to state any contractual claim for relief and lacks constitutional standing to assert a violation of any arguably applicable consumer protection law. View "Katz v. Pershing, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant,convicted of 21 counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault against his two stepchildren, four counts of endangering the welfare of a child and one count of indecent exposure and lewdness, exhausted direct appeals in New Hampshire state courts. The federal district court denied his petition for habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. 2254, rejecting claims that the trial court violated his Confrontation Clause rights by prohibiting him from cross-examining his stepchildren regarding their accusations that he had also abused younger siblings. The First Circuit affirmed. Exclusion of cross-examination did not deprive defendant of a defense; he was able to introduce other evidence that the children "invented" the allegations. Trial courts may place reasonable limits on cross-examination based on concerns about harassment, prejudice, confusion of issues, witness safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. View "Abram v. Gerry" on Justia Law

After both plaintiff and her employer purported to terminate plaintiff's employment contract, the employer sought a declaratory judgment in the court of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, concerning a release that it wanted plaintiff to sign. While the case was pending, plaintiff filed suit for breach of contract in federal court, invoking diversity jurisdiction. The district court dismissed without prejudice. After the declaratory judgment action was resolved in favor of the employee, the court denied a motion to set aside the dismissal. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the case does not present the extraordinary circumstances required under the Colorado River doctrine to justify surrender of federal jurisdiction. View "Nazario-Lugo v. Caribevision Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendants were convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine, and to possess it with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(ii), and 846. The First Circuit affirmed, finding that the evidence was sufficient to prove defendant was a conspirator and to support the finding of the amount of the drug attributable to him. The trial court properly admitted evidence of law enforcement officers' precautions in executing a search warrant and in refusing to declare a mistrial sua sponte in response to prosecution testimony referring to a threat of violence by one of defendant's co-conspirators and to the Mexican origin of the drugs. View "United States v. Garcia" on Justia Law

An 11-year-old child suffered long-term horrific abuse and, in 2005, was beaten nearly to death by her adoptive mother and stepfather. The child's legal guardian, brought suit against Carson Center and one of its employees, a licensed social worker, alleging that they failed to detect or report signs of ongoing physical abuse. The state court suit led to insurance coverage litigation in federal court. Insurers sought a declaratory judgment that the allegations fell within exclusions to coverage. The First Circuit affirmed entry of declaratory judgment for the insurers. The language of the policy exclusions precludes coverage for abuse that occurs to anyone in the insureds' "care, custody or control." At the time of the abuse the victim was not in the physical custody of the insureds, but had been receiving bi-weekly outpatient therapeutic services from them for 14 months covered by the policies in question. The exclusions are unambiguous. View "Valley Forge Ins. Co. v. Field" on Justia Law

Defendant was injured in 2007 while driving an automobile insured under an ASIC policy that indemnifies against injuries caused by negligent uninsured or underinsured motorists. After determining that the tortfeasors were underinsured, defendant received authorization from ASIC to settle pursuant to Rhode Island's UM/UIM insurance statute, R.I. Gen. Laws 27-7-2.1. Within three months, defendant and the tortfeasors agreed to a settlement of $1 million. ASIC refused to pay under the UM/UIM provisions and sought a declaratory judgment that the claim did not comply with a policy requirement that a claim be made within three years after the date of the accident. The district court granted ASIC judgment on the pleadings. The First Circuit certified to the state supreme court the question of whether the policy limitation is enforceable under state law. The court noted that, by requiring the three-year limitations period to run from the date of the accident, the policy may require some insureds to file suit before their claims are ripe--before the insurer determines whether it will cover the claim. The limitations period may even require some insureds to file suit before it becomes clear that the tortfeasor is underinsured.