Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a Guatemalan national, entered the U.S. illegally in 1997. DHS initiated removal about 10 years later, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). She applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture,asserting that if returned to Guatemala, she would face persecution on account of her status as either a single woman with perceived wealth or a former "child of war." The IJ determined that her claim for asylum was time-barred; denied withholding of removal on the ground that she had failed to demonstrate a likelihood of persecution in Guatemala on account of a statutorily protected status; and dismissed her entreaty for CAT relief because she had not shown any governmental involvement in the feared harm. The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit denied review, finding no connection between her claimed fears and the government of Guatemala.

After being extradited from Columbia, petitioner was convicted in federal court for his part in a drug conspiracy. He twice sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255, without success. He then sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241 for alleged violations of the extradition treaty. The district court denied relief, deeming the petition an attempt to circumvent the limits on section 2255. The First Circuit affirmed. Relief under section 2255 does cover violations of treaties and petitioner cannot circumvent the limits on multiple section 2255 petitions by resorting to section 2241 to assert a treaty claim that could as easily have been advanced in his original section 2255 petition.

Petitioner entered the U.S. in 1992 without being admitted or paroled and filed an affirmative asylum application, asserting that he had been persecuted and had a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of his political beliefs. He asserted that he was at risk because of his opposition to guerillas who occupied his village during the Salvadoran civil war and that he had been conscripted at gunpoint. Following an unexplained delay, federal authorities initiated removal in 2007. An immigration judge found the petitioner credible but concluded that he failed to substantiate a cognizable claim of past or future persecution, noting peace accords signed between the guerillas and the Salvadoran government in 1991 and the absence of evidence that any remaining guerillas would continue to harbor an interest in the petitioner. The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit denied appeal.

The First Circuit previously rejected claims that Maine's laws regulating political action committees were unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Plaintiffs then challenged the law applicable to ballot question committees (BQCs), Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 21-A, 1056-B, imposing registration and disclosure requirements on entities that finance election-related advocacy. The district court upheld the law on summary judgment. The First Circuit affirmed, upholding the law's definition of "contribution." Plaintiffs demonstrated no circumstances in which the statute fails to provide them fair warning of its reach. The $100 reporting threshold is narrowly tailored to meet Maine's compelling interest in an informed electorate.

Plaintiff was arrested for obstructing a police officer. Charges were dropped; he brought an action against the officers involved, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983. A jury ruled in favor of one of the officers. Plaintiff moved for a new trial based on exclusion of evidence concerning statements allegedly made to plaintiff before the arrest. The First Circuit affirmed. There was no probative value to the proffered evidence and the officer's alleged statement would have been unduly prejudicial

Petitioner, a Brazilian national, entered the U.S. illegally in 2006 and was apprehended by DHS, which initiated removal proceedings, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). Sh conceded removability and sought asylum and other relief, alleging that she had seen two men fleeing from the scene of a neighbor's murder and was subsequently threatened. She indicated that the police in Brazil are corrupt and often allow criminals to kill witnesses. The IJ deemed the evidence insufficient, finding that her fear was unconnected to any statutorily protected ground and that she did not establish that the Brazilian government was either unable or unwilling to protect her. The BIA agreed. The First Circuit denied review. Petitioner chose to premise both her claim of past persecution and her claim of fear of future persecution on her membership in a group that lacks the requisite social visibility.

Airline insurance (USAUI) issued to Pace covered certain risks assumed by Pace in contractual arrangements with other companies, which generally consisted of charter programs. The policy referenced "legally obligated to pay as damages." Pace entered into a charter program contractual arrangement with Patriot, which entered into an agreement to transport L&M customers to destinations that L&M had booked for travelers. L&M purchased a required surety bond. In 2002, L&M claimed that Patriot had unlawfully refused to provide aircraft for scheduled flights, and Patriot contended that L&M not fulfilled payment obligations. Patriot terminated the agreement and, two months later, filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11. L&M filed a proof of claim. The bankruptcy court disallowed the claim. In 2005, L&M filed suit, claiming coverage by policies, including the USAUI policy. The district court held that the policy did not provide coverage for a breach of contract claim. The First Circuit affirmed, finding no ambiguity in policy language.

In 1998, the doctor sued his employer (a hospital) in a Puerto Rico court, alleging that the hospital had discriminated against him because of his age. In 2004, one day after he was deposed in connection with that lawsuit, the hospital terminated his employment. The termination decision had been made before the deposition. He then sued in federal court, under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. 623(d), and Puerto Rico's general tort statute, Article 1802, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, 5141 alleging that he was terminated in retaliation. A jury awarded nearly $2 million. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments based on the statute of limitations, proof of causation, and jury instructions.

A federal jury awarded Fortin $125,000 in damages against a police officer after finding that the officer negligently used force in arresting Fortin in 2007. In a post-judgment ruling, the district court reduced the award to $10,000, the maximum set by the Maine Tort Claims Act for the personal liability of government employees, Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 14, 8104-D. On appeal, Fortin argued that the MTCA cap is inapplicable here because the officer was covered by an insurance policy that triggered a higher limit under the Act. The First Circuit determined that the issues were unresolved under state law and certified two questions to the Maine Supreme Court. Whether Fortin is limited to recovery of $10,000 depends on the unexplored relationship among several provisions of the MTCA governing damage awards against government employees. Analysis may also require determining what interpretive rule should be applied to ambiguous insurance policies providing MTCA liability coverage.

Petitioner, serving two life terms for first degree murder, exhausted state appeals and was denied habeas corpus. His trial counsel had conceded that petitioner committed the shootings, but attempted to establish insanity. The First Circuit affirmed. Any errors committed under state law with respect to establishing competence or intoxication did not create federal constitutional issues.