Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was employed as a custodial worker at a Coast Guard Air Station in Puerto Rico for four and one half years before being fired for allegedly pilfering various items. He filed suit against the federal government under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), 2671 , and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701, alleging constitutional violations and negligence. The district court dismissed. The First Circuit affirmed. State law is the source of substantive liability under the FTCA; the Act does not waive immunity for constitutional tort claims. The district court, therefore, lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

Plaintiffs, former sales managers at defendant's banquet facilities, sought overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201-219 and state statutes.The district court entered summary judgment, finding that they were exempt employees. The First Circuit affirmed. The district court properly applied the three-prong test for determining whether an employee qualifies for the administrative exemption. Plaintiffs, who were salaried, performed work directly related to the management or general business operations of the employer in working closely with clients to plan events. They exercised substantial discretion with respect to a number of tasks.

DEA agents and local police went to a residence with a warrant to arrest a drug dealer, but no warrant to search. When the owner opened the door, they entered and spent 15-20 minutes questioning the owner's wife and looking for the drug dealer, who was not in the house. Agents seized a vehicle that had been used in a drug deal. The district court rejected Fourth Amendment claims, citing qualified immunity, and claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 1346(b), 2671-2680. The First Circuit affirmed. The agents' actions were not manifestly unreasonable.

Mortgage deeds executed by the debtors three years earlier were still pending recordation when they filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Debtors sought to avoid the mortgages and to prevent any post-petition actions that would perfect them 11 U.S.C. 362(a)(5), 544(a), 547(b). The bankruptcy court ruled in favor of the lender. The district court and First Circuit affirmed. Debtors failed to establish the necessary elements of a preferential transfer.

After a gang fight, officers followed and stopped defendant by blocking his path. They did not recognize defendant or have reason to believe he was involved in gang activity. Based on his hand motions, as if he were protecting his abdomen, an officer placed a hand on defendant's waist. A struggle ensued, officers subdued defendant, and found a gun in his waistband. Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition despite having a prior felony conviction (18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1)) and possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number (18 U.S.C. 922(k)). The First Circuit reversed, holding that the gun should have been suppressed. The initial detention of defendant constituted a seizure rather than a consensual encounter; the officers lacked an objectively reasonable, particularized basis for suspecting him of criminal activity. Regardless of the validity of the "pat frisk," the evidence was tainted.

Defendant, convicted of interstate stalking, cyberstalking, and mailing a threatening communication (18 U.S.C. 2261A(1)-(2), 876(c)), based on communications with his estranged wife and minor child, was sentenced to 137 months. The First Circuit affirmed. The district court acted within its discretion in denying a change of venue or transfer. There was sufficient evidence to support the convictions. Defendant waived challenge to the indictment under FRCP 12(e); he did not show good cause for failing to raise the challenge before trial. The court acted within its discretion in allowing evidence of prior bad acts and imposing the sentence.

Employees of the fire department filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging cronysim and nepotism in employment decisions. The district court granted summary judgment for the department, finding that nothing linked the employment decisions to an identifiable political group, cause, or belief. The First Circuit affirmed. Preferential treatment in public employment decisions, unrelated to protected speech or association, does not infringe upon freedoms secured by the First Amendment.

Police, responding to a 911 call, stopped plaintiff, a pedestrian. While he was standing near the cruiser, it was struck from behind by a second cruiser. Plaintiff, injured in the collision, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed, citing qualified immunity. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the collision constituted a seizure. The facts could reasonably support the officers' suspicion that plaintiff was the subject of the 911 call and that the stop was reasonable.

Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder for killing his mother. The district court denied a petition for habeas corpus. The First Circuit affirmed. Admission of expert testimony at trial, based on the expert's review of the autopsy report and photographs, was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. Precedent cited by petitioner did not "clearly establish" that either the autopsy report or the expert's opinion in partial reliance upon it were inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause.

Officers visited defendant's apartment after setting up a drug buy. Defendant invited them in. Officers spotted a "bait" bill, previously marked and given to the buyer as part of the set up, on a table. Defendant signed a waiver and allowed a search. The officers discovered drugs and guns. Convicted of knowingly and intentionally possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, defendant was sentenced to 84 months. The First Circuit affirmed, first upholding denial of a motion to suppress. A $20 bill, previously marked by an officer, was in plain sight when officers entered defendant's apartment and, if lifting the bill to eye level did constitute a search, the officer had probable cause. A four level sentencing enhancement was appropriate under USSG 2K2.1(b)(6). The government showed that defendant had committed a qualifying second felony (possessing and dealing drugs) and that he possessed the seized firearm "in connection with" that second felony, even though the gun was not readily accessible.