Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1995 Puerto Rico enacted a law mandating minimum liability insurance for drivers and created the Asociación de Suscripción Conjunta del Seguro de Responsabilidad Obligatorio to provide compulsory liability insurance to those otherwise unable or unwilling to obtain insurance; the Association insures about 80 percent of vehicles in Puerto Rico. In 2008 the Association challenged regulations that limit its distribution of profits to members (insurance companies) and require that other revenue be kept in a reserve. The district court dismissed a "taking claim" under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The First Circuit affirmed. Facial claims were time-barred; other claims were not properly raised.

After an election, in which the political party that had been in power in the municipality for eight years lost power, the new mayor hired a consultant to evaluate the budget. In response to the report, which indicated severe financial problems, several employees were terminated and sue, claiming deprivation of due process and political discrimination, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court entered summary judgment for defendants. The First Circuit affirmed. The reorganization was bona fide, not pretextual, and would have been implemented regardless of the employees' political affiliations. There was no evidence that the mayor knew the political affiliations of the employees.

Defendant pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to smuggle illegal aliens into the U.S. (8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(i), (v)(I) and was sentenced to 12 months and one day of imprisonment, followed by three years supervised release. Shortly after defendant's release, her probation officer filed a motion requesting a written reprimand and warning because defendant had tested positive twice for cocaine use. The court never acted on the motion, but defendant entered a treatment program. After she left the treatment program, the probation officer filed another motion, which remained pending until defendant was arrested about four years later. The district court revoked her supervised release and sentenced her to time served and 26 months of additional supervised release. The First Circuit affirmed. The district court had relation-back jurisdiction under the Delayed Revocation Statute, 18 U.S.C. 3583(i), even though the warrant on which defendant was arrested was not based on an oath or affirmation.

Defendant, a patent attorney and licensed engineer, the divorced father of children born in 1985, 1986, and 1991, was ordered in 2002 to pay weekly child support of $1,406 per week plus $300 per week toward past medical expenses. He has paid no child support since issuance of the final order. He attempted to appeal the order to the U.S. Supreme Court and filed unsuccessful suits and appeals in four states (New Hampshire, Vermont, Virginia, and Maryland) and in two federal courts, arguing that the order was invalid because the New Hampshire court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Convicted of willful failure to pay child support, 18 U.S.C. 228(a)(3), defendant was sentenced to 24 months in prison. The First Circuit affirmed, finding the evidence sufficient to support findings that he was able to pay and willfully refused to pay. The district court properly charged the jury on willful blindness.

Officers executed a search warrant at defendant's residence and found a loaded firearm, defendant's identification, five bags of heroin, a bag of cocaine, $500 in cash, a razor blade, and empty baggies. In custody, he waived his Miranda rights and told the police that the gun belonged to him. Convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), defendant was sentenced as an armed career criminal, 18 U.S.C. 924(e), to 226 months in prison. The First Circuit affirmed the conviction, but vacated the sentence. Because two of defendant's prior convictions were for serious drug offenses and drug-dealing is notoriously linked to violence, the court rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of the felon-in-possession law. The prosecution's reference to defendant as a drug dealer was not improper, despite the fact that he was not charged with drug crimes. In sentencing, the court relied on two Massachusetts assault and battery convictions as predicate offenses without evidence that the felonies involved violence.

Plaintiff wished to open a franchise in Puerto Rico and sought assistance from defendants, who asserted that it was a "done deal" and accepted a $400,000 retainer, a $100,000 business brokers' fee, and another $125,000 before informing plaintiff that the company at issue does not offer franchises. The district court awarded plaintiff $625,000. The First Circuit affirmed and remanded, rejecting a challenge to jury instructions on "dolo" (fraud) as involving harmless error. The evidence supported the verdict; the district court properly excluded evidence of a settlement agreement, but should have used that settlement to offset the verdict.

Plaintiff, an employee of the USDA since 1977, claimed discrimination based on age and gender and retaliation for having complained about discrimination in the past. The district court entered summary judgment against her on claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(a). The First Circuit affirmed. Having failed to raise a claim of sex-based discrimination in her 1997 EEOC complaint, plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Her retaliation claim failed for lack of proof of causation. The passage of several years, coupled with the fact that the person in question merely had knowledge of plaintiff's prior complaints, made any inference of causation unreasonable. An age discrimination claim failed because no reasonable fact-finder could conclude that age was a motivating factor in the decision to promote another, rather than plaintiff.

Defendant entered a guilty plea to arson of a building owned by an organization receiving federal financial assistance, 18 U.S.C. 844(f). After a prior appeal led to remand for resentencing, defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion to withdraw his plea. The First Circuit affirmed. The loan scheme in question fit the statutory definition, even though the federal funds had been disbursed before the arson. An arsonist would be fairly warned that the building was related to a current federal loan.

A class action was brought against companies engaged in credit repair and debt consolidation, alleging a scheme to defraud debtors in violation of the federal Credit Repair Organizations Act, 15 U.S.C. 1679, and the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A. The court entered judgment in favor of the class for $259 million, and established a constructive trust over "all fees that consumers paid to the current or former defendant entities." Finding the judgment largely uncollectable, plaintiffs filed complaints against auditing firms and law firms that had assisted defendants in the class action. The district court dismissed. The First Circuit affirmed. The constructive trust cannot be read as intended to claw back monies expended, prior to the imposition of the trust, by defendants, in the ordinary course of business and in exchange for fair value. It is not unjust enrichment for lawyers and accountants to be paid for their services. In addition, plaintiffs were seeking "class-based relief" but did not seek certification of the class as required by FRCP 23.

After discovery of previously-undisclosed evidence, plaintiff's murder conviction was vacated and he was released after more than 30 years in prison. His suit for damages, against the city and detectives, was dismissed. The First Circuit affirmed in part. Holding that the detectives were entitled to qualified immunity on one count, the court noted that in 1972 it was not clearly established that Brady's no-fault disclosure obligation applied to police officers as opposed to prosecutors. They were not entitled to immunity on a claim of deliberate deception in concealing evidence and allowing false testimony. Plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to state a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim for municipal liability.