Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The company began requiring its field technicians to carry company-issued cell phones during work. The phones contain a GPS, which allows the company to monitor the locations of the technicians, who are represented by a union. An unfair labor practice, filed with the NLRB, is apparently in arbitration. The technicians filed a separate suit, claiming the policy violated their privacy rights under Article 14 of the Declaration of Rights in the Massachusetts Constitution and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 214, 1B, and their state-law rights as alleged third-party beneficiaries of a contract the company and its provider, which they say required the company to receive consent from its employees when it instituted the phone policy. The district court dismissed. The First Circuit affirmed. The claims are preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185(a); the technicians did not file a grievance under the collective bargaining agreement.

The claim arose from an accident at a construction site. The company was insured under its own commercial general liability policy, issued by Acadia, and as an additional insured on a subcontractor's policy, issued by AIG. Both policies contained provisions that: This insurance is excess over: (1) Any of the other insurance, whether primary, excess, contingent, or on any other basis . . . (a) That is . . . coverage for "your work"; . . .(2) Any other primary insurance available to you covering liability for damages arising out of the premises or operations for which you have been added as an additional insured by attachment of an endorsement. The company and Acadia sought declaratory judgment that AIG was obligated to defend the construction company and compensation of costs incurred by Acadia that defense. The district court granted judgment in AIG's favor. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the plain language of the policy requires that the Acadia policy be treated as excess over the AIG policy. The word "you" refers solely to the listed Named Insured in the policy Declarations or "qualifying as Named Insureds" under the policy.

Defendant was convicted of two counts of attempting to entice a minor to engage in sexual conduct, 18 U.S.C.§ 2422(b), entered a plea of guilty to a charge of possession of child pornography, and was sentenced to 200 months in prison. The First Circuit affirmed, finding the evidence adequate to support the conviction. Even if the indictment was insufficient in alleging that defendant attempted to entice sexual conduct for which he could be charged with a criminal offense, he was not prejudiced because he received ample notice of which Maine statutes he was claimed to have violated.

During a raid of a motel room in which he was a guest, defendant was place on the floor and handcuffed in the wake of his host's arrest on drug charges. Defendant consented to a search of his pants pocket to locate identification; the search turned up seven small bags of crack cocaine. A dozen rounds of .38-caliber ammunition were later discovered in the pocket of his jacket. After unsuccessfully moving to suppress this evidence, he entered a conditional guilty plea to charges of simple possession of cocaine and possession of a firearm after a prior felony conviction. The First Circuit affirmed. Given consent to retrieve an object from a cramped space, like a pocket, it is objectively reasonable to assume that the consent extends to the removal of items that either may constitute the object of the search and cannot be immediately identified or that obstruct further access to other items in the pocket. The consent was voluntary. The circumstances justified use of handcuffs and drawn guns. Defendant was experienced in dealing with law enforcement and showed no signs of intimidation.

Defendant, charged with selling 86 social security cards and birth certificates to undercover agents, entered a plea of guilty on one count of aggravated identity theft, based on an agreement whereby the prosecution agreed to dismiss remaining counts of the indictment. The plea agreement stated that the guidelines sentence was the two-year term of imprisonment required by the statute, 18 U.S.C. 1028A. The plea contained a waiver-of-appeal provision. Defendant subsequently filed four pro se motions concerning his attorney's performance, computation of the guidelines range, and his lack of awareness of the consequences of pleading guilty to aggravated identity theft. The district court refused to allow him to withdraw his plea and imposed a sentence of two years in prison. Even if the prosecutor overstated his sentencing exposure on the original charges, that statement was made months after the guilty plea and did not influence defendant's decision.

In 2002 one of the company's founders informed the company that he wanted the company to buy out his 23 percent stock ownership interest. The company agreed to pay $255,908 plus $400,000, the equivalent of one year's salary, for a one-year covenant not to compete. The company amortized the covenant payments over the 12-month duration, which straddled tax years 2002 and 2003. The IRS determined that the covenant was an amortizable section 197 intangible, amortizable over 15 years and not over the duration of the covenant. The tax court upheld the decision. The First Circuit affirmed. A "section 197 intangible" includes any covenant not to compete entered into in connection with the acquisition of any shares, substantial or not, of stock in a corporation that is engaged in a trade or business.

In 2001, a jury convicted defendant of reckless second-degree murder, five counts of second-degree assault, endangering the welfare of a minor, and simple assault in connection with the death of his girlfriend's 21-month-old daughter. The trial court ordered a term of 28 years to life on the murder conviction, but imposed suspended sentences on the remaining charges. A few months before sentencing, New Hampshire changed the law to allow the state as well to apply for review of sentences. An appellate court imposed sentences of 5 to 10 years on one of the second degree assault charges and 10 to 30 years on a second such charge, increasing defendant's minimum term from 28 to 43 years. The state's highest court affirmed. The federal district court denied a petition for habeas corpus. The First Circuit affirmed. If Supreme Court cases give no clear answer to the question presented, a state court's resolution of a constitutional question may not serve as a basis for habeas relief. In this case, no one can be sure what the Supreme Court would do in a case involving Ex Post Facto doctrine in this new and different context.

The city and stopped paying full reimbursement of certain medical expenses for former firefighters and police officers who had retired on disability pensions. The retirees alleged that the decision violated state statutes, constituted an ultra vires act, contradicted principles of equity, and offended the Due Process Clause.The district court entered summary judgment against all but three of the plaintiffs and resolved the remaining claims after trial. The First Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rulings. The state injured-on-duty statute does not require the benefit and there was no evidence that the city ever authorized such a benefit on a global basis or made specific promises to retirees, other than the three that went to trial.

The district court entered an order to enforce a settlement agreement against a partner, which the partner signed after mediation of several lawsuits concerning six family-run real estate partnerships. The partner had filed no objection within the 14-day period required under the local rules. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting the partner's challenges to subject matter jurisdiction. The court's order that the partner sign a release was within its power and claims that the settlement was ambiguous were too late.

A Ph.D., in his late 40s, twice applied for an assistant professorship at University of Puerto Rico. A 30-year-old was ultimately hired. The district court dismissed an age discrimination action (29 U.S.C. 623(a),(d)) on the ground that the University is an arm of the state entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court. Th First Circuit affirmed, based on structural factors and the potential financial impact on state finances