Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in May, 2011
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In 2009, defendant engaged in sales of cocaine base to an undercover agent in Maine. In January 2010 he entered a plea of guilty to conspiracy to distribute and to possession with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a), 841(b), and 846. The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372, effective August 2010, reduced the drug quantity thresholds required to trigger specific mandatory minimum sentences. On November1, 2010, the sentencing guidelines were amended. On November 8, the district court imposed a sentence of 56 months, rather than the 10-year mandatory minimum set by the pre-FSA drug statute. The First Circuit affirmed, stating that the FSA does not address retroactive application, but that it was unrealistic to suppose that Congress strongly desired to put the new quantity threshold guidelines in effect by November 1, even for crimes committed before the FSA, but balked at giving the same defendants the benefit of the new minimum sentencing guidelines.

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The parties agree that defendant has used the mark continuously since 1998, Plaintiff claims, and defendant disputes, use since 1989. The defendant applied for registration of the mark in 1998 and the USPTO issued registration in 2002. The plaintiff applied for registration in 2000. The USPTO initially denied, but in 2008 granted, registration. The defendant sent a cease-and-desist letter in 2000, but plaintiff continued to use the mark. The parties negotiated and, in 2005, entered an agreement under which defendant would advertise on plaintiff's website. The relationship broke down and, in 2008 defendant petitioned the USPTO to cancel plaintiff's registration; the petition is still pending. Plaintiff sought declaratory judgment and defendant counterclaimed. The district court entered a preliminary injunction in favor of defendant. The First Circuit vacated and remanded. The district court erred in presuming irreparable harm upon finding a likelihood of success on the merits, in a case where there has been an excessive delay in seeking relief.

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While the recording of the deed to mortgaged property was in "limbo" because of a defect, the borrowers declared bankruptcy, resulting in a stay under 11 U.S.C. 362. The lender nonetheless presented a corrected deed for registration. The borrowers filed suit and the court ordered that the deed be withdrawn, but denied damages and fees. The bankruptcy appellate panel affirmed. The First Circuit reversed and remanded, stating that there was no justification for disregarding the statutory language concerning awards of damages and fees for willful violation of a stay.

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After gang-member shooting victims were taken to the hospital, police officers watching the emergency room entrance, observed the defendant and another known gang member leaving. They followed and pulled over the speeding car. Believing the occupants to be acting "nervous" and to have a gun, the officers conducted a thorough search of the car and found a gun and crack cocaine hidden in an access panel. A second search, by an expert familiar with "hides," revealed ammunition. Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty as a felon in possession (18 U.S.C. 922(g)). The district court denied a motion to suppress and sentenced defendant to 188 months incarceration. The First Circuit affirmed. The officers had reasonable suspicion, the five-minute duration of the search before the gun was found was reasonable, and the scope of the search, including the easily accessible hidden compartment, was reasonable.

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After a drug search, plaintiff, a 12-year veteran of the police force, notified his supervisor that he had $600 that had been found in the house. He followed instructions and returned the money to its owner. He was suspended without pay. The officer was acquitted of criminal charges before the suspension hearing, which occurred six months after his request. After the hearing, he was terminated from the department. The Investigation, Processing and Appeals Commission and Puerto Rico Court of Appeals affirmed. The federal district court ultimately dismissed all claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The First Circuit affirmed. The district court properly applied collateral estoppel; plaintiff had a full opportunity to litigate the issues at the administrative and state court levels and a "public policy" exception does not apply. Plaintiff's due process rights were not violated by the 14-day delay between his acquittal and the administrative hearing.

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In 1994 the federal government filed suit to remedy conditions in Puerto Rican juvenile detention facilities. The court approved a settlement in 1997. A 2007 order terminated some conditions and modified and retained others. The parties continued sparring over failure to achieve specified staff levels; a 2009 order required hiring of 50 staff members per month until the goal was reached. Six months later, the federal government moved for a finding of civil contempt. The district court took no action on either the contempt motion or Puerto Rico's request to modify or terminate the 2009 order before 180 days had passed, and the prospective relief provisions were stayed (18 U.S.C. 3626(a)). The court subsequently denied the motion for contempt. The Third Circuit dismissed, reasoning that there is nothing to enforce because the 2009 order was stayed as a result of the motion to modify or terminate. The two motions involve the same argument: whether Puerto Rico is financially able to comply with the 2009 order. The court urged the district court to decide Puerto Rico's motion promptly.

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Defendant was charged with sales of crack cocaine in 2006. The pre-sentence report classified him as a career offender and he was sentenced to 90 months incarceration. The Third Circuit held that a 1997 Massachusetts conviction for conspiracy to violate state drug laws did not qualify as a predicate offense. On remand, the court admitted three new documents to establish a New York conviction, held that the defendant's presence was not required at the hearing, and reaffirmed the career offender designation and 90-month sentence. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded, noting the various options available to the court. The defendant should be permitted to allocute and to raise the issue of post-sentencing rehabilitation.

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Plaintiff sued her former employer for gender-based discrimination and hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and Puerto Rico law. A jury awarded damages for emotional distress; the judge reduced the $350,000 award to $200,000. The First Circuit affirmed, finding the evidence sufficient to support the verdict and to support the jury's rejection of a defense that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct harassment and that the employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer.

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The plaintiff, a U.S. Marine, claims that he was injured by police who were ejecting a fan during a baseball game. Criminal charges brought against the plaintiff for his involvement in the incident were dismissed and he filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court awarded damages against the municipality ($35,000) and against each of four officers ($10,000 each). The First Circuit affirmed. The district court acted within its discretion in rejecting defendants' motions based on untimely service of process; in entering default judgments for defendants' repeated failures to comply with discovery orders; in admitting evidence about the plaintiff's psychological treatment; and in refusing to give the municipality's proposed jury instruction on causation..

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The petitioner entered the United States without authorization from the Ivory Coast in 2000, leaving his family behind. His application for asylum, based on two incidents of arrest and detention, was denied, and he was deemed eligible for removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals and the First Circuit affirmed, noting inconsistencies in the application and testimony, lack of corroboration, and the petitioner's evasive answers. The finding that the petitioner's testimony was not credible was supported by substantial evidence.