Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The defendant referred two investors to a friend who invested their money in a company of which the defendant and his friend were directors. They were defrauded of their entire $290,000 investment. The defendant received nearly $20,000 of the misappropriated funds. He was convicted on ten counts of wire fraud and the district court sentenced him to 37 monthsâ imprisonment. The First Circuit affirmed. A reasonable jury could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant participated in his friend's wire fraud scheme with knowledge and intent to defraud the investors. The court properly imposed a two-level vulnerable victim sentence enhancement, noting that a victim was an elderly widow who died before the trial, and properly imposed a loss enhancement because the amount of the reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm was between $200,000 and $400,000.

In 2003 the hotel and the union entered into an agreement in anticipation of renovation of a dilapidated structure into the Renaissance Providence Hotel. The agreement allowed the union to organize hotel employees and seek recognition as their collective bargaining representative; the union would refrain from picketing or economic activity against the hotel. In 2010 the union requested recognition pursuant to the card recognition procedure described in the agreement; the hotel declined, claiming that the agreement had expired, and declined to participate in arbitration. The district court ordered arbitration. The First Circuit affirmed and awarded costs to the union. The meaning of the phrase "full public opening" in the duration clause of the agreement falls within the provision that "any dispute over ... interpretation or application" will be submitted to arbitration.

The defendant was convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court applied an armed career criminal (ACCA) enhancement based on three prior convictions, including a conviction as a juvenile, to arrive at a minimum sentence of 15 years. The prosecution used a police report to establish that the juvenile offense involved use of a knife. The First Circuit affirmed. In a subsequent habeas corpus proceeding, the district court held a hearing, considered evidence other than the police report, and again applied the ACCA enhancement. The First Circuit affirmed, applying the "law of the case" doctrine. At the time of his first appeal, the defendant had access to Supreme Court precedent concerning the method through which a predicate conviction can be proved under the ACCA and forbidding use of a police report for that purpose. There is no reason to doubt that the defendant actually used the knife and there has been no intervening change in law.

After receiving information from an informant, conducting a controlled drug buy, and surveillance of the defendant, officers obtained warrants to search a house, an apartment, and the defendant's person. The defendant spotted the surveillance and led police on a high-speed chase before leaving the car in his mother's driveway and running. He was apprehended with $1,081 on his person. Police found a loaded gun and cocaine in the car, cocaine and needles in the house, and cocaine, a scale, and chemicals in the apartment. The defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and gun possession in furtherance of a drug crime. The First Circuit affirmed, finding the evidence sufficient to support the jury verdict. The trial court properly refused to suppress the gun; there was probable cause for a search of every part of the car, despite it being unoccupied and parked on a private driveway. The court affirmed the 25-year sentence, imposed months before the effective date of the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act, which reduced the sentence for certain drug crimes. The Act does not apply retroactively.

The inmate, convicted of second-degree murder in 1993 and violation of a domestic relations restraining order in 2010, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, based on a decision that he was ineligible for a pre-parole community diversion program. The district court dismissed. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the claims were barred as res judicata. While the federal case was pending, the Puerto Rican Court of Appeals affirmed that the inmate was not entitled to participate in the program. The court took judicial notice of the decision, despite failure to provide a timely English translation and the government's failure to argue res judicata below.

Franchisees, operating gas stations in Puerto Rico, alleged violations of the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act (PMPA), 15 U.S.C. 2801, based on the Esso's plan to leave the market and terminate their contracts. Esso sold its assets to Total and most of the franchisees eventually contracted with Total. The district court found some of the terms of the Total franchise contract invalid, but severable, and denied injunctive relief and damages against Esso. The First Circuit affirmed, first holding that PMPA does not require that terms offered by a substitute franchisor be identical for each franchisee and that there was no evidence that Total acted other than in good faith or intended that its offers would be rejected. That Total's franchise contract, consisting of more than 100 pages, contained five provisions found partially invalid under state law, did not render it "per se" in violation of PMPA.

After Massachusetts rejected the petitioner's appeals from his conviction on charges relating to distribution of cocaine, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, holding that chemical analysts were witnesses for purposes of the Sixth Amendment and must be available for cross-examination and confrontation. The district court denied a subsequent petition for habeas corpus and the First Circuit affirmed. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2254, the issue is whether the state's decision violated clearly established federal law. Federal law was not clearly established at the time of the state decision.

The Puerto Rico Examining Board of Accountants required a CPA to submit to involuntary practice review and denied a requested postponement. The CPA failed to appear at a hearing. The Board did not respond to a request to reschedule, but suspended his license. Following a request for reconsideration, the Board sent notice that did not comply with statutory requirements, held a hearing, and declined to lift the suspension. The CPA completed the practice review after the deadline; the Board again declined to lift the suspension. The Board sent another non-compliant notice, held another hearing, and revoked the CPA's license. A Puerto Rico court ordered reinstatement. The federal district court dismissed claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the individual Board defendants perform functions similar to judges and are protected by immunity. They act under a statute that provides for due process and their actions are reviewable in Puerto Rico courts. Although they made serious procedural errors, the Board members had jurisdiction to take the actions at issue.

After the plaintiff publicly criticized town council policies, the council denied him reappointment to an unpaid advisory commission concerned with recreational facilities. The district court rejected his 42 U.S.C. 1983 civil rights suit on summary judgment. The First Circuit affirmed. The court assumed that the council's decision was based on the plaintiff's exercise of First Amendment rights and held that the plaintiff's former position and his comments related to policy. Analogizing to firings based on political party affiliation, the court held that the balance weighs in favor of the town's need to accomplish its policy objectives through loyal, cooperative individuals whom the public will perceive as sharing the administration's goals.

Homeowners fell behind on their mortgage and the bank initiated foreclosure. The homeowners filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy. The judge denied their motion for rescission of the mortgage and for damages, based on noncompliance with state laws. The district court and First Circuit affirmed. The homeowners signed right-to-cancel forms required under the Massachusetts Consumer Credit Cost Disclosure Act, modeled after the federal Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C. 1635); technical flaws in the form cannot serve as a basis for invalidating a transaction five years later. Similarly, a slight delay in receipt of a required high-cost loan disclosure did not justify rescission five years later.