Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The defendant, Heclouis Nieves-Díaz, was on supervised release for a federal drug conviction when he was convicted of possession of ammunition as a convicted felon, illegal possession of a machine gun, and possession with intent to distribute cocaine. He received an 84-month prison term for each conviction, to be served concurrently. His supervised release was also revoked, resulting in an additional 18-month prison term to be served consecutively to his 84-month sentences.Nieves had previously pleaded guilty to one count of drug conspiracy and was sentenced to 80 months of imprisonment and 96 months of supervised release. His term of supervised release was twice revoked. While on his third term of supervised release, Nieves was arrested following a search of an apartment where he was residing. The search yielded cocaine, marijuana, approximately 149 rounds of .223 caliber ammunition, and a device that could convert a Glock pistol into a fully automatic weapon.Nieves appealed his 84-month sentences and the revocation sentence. He argued that the District Court improperly calculated his Guidelines Sentencing Range (GSR) for each of the underlying offenses and that the court's application of a four-level enhancement was incorrect.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit found that the District Court did err in applying the four-level enhancement, as the record did not support the determination that the ammunition in this case had the required potentially facilitative effect. Therefore, the court vacated the District Court's sentences and remanded for resentencing. However, the court affirmed the revocation sentence, finding it both procedurally and substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Nieves-Diaz" on Justia Law

In 2015, Universitas Education, LLC initiated a lawsuit against Jack E. Robinson, III, alleging violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Robinson defended himself until his death in November 2017. After Robinson's death, the focus of the case shifted to finding a proper party to substitute as a representative of his estate. Universitas identified Lillian Granderson, Robinson's mother, as a suitable substitute and filed motions to substitute her into the case and to enter default judgment against her. The district court granted both motions.On appeal, Granderson argued that the district court erred in granting Universitas' motion to substitute and motion for default judgment. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to substitute Granderson into the case, but vacated the default judgment. The court found that Granderson had defended the case and no entry of default had been entered against her, which was a requirement for a default judgment. The case was remanded back to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "Universitas Education, LLC v. Granderson" on Justia Law

Edgar Centariczki, the defendant, pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting the distribution of methamphetamine and fentanyl in 2021. He was sentenced to time served (two days) and three years of supervised release. His case was transferred to the District of Maine, where he resided. Between June and October of 2021, Centariczki tested positive for marijuana and cocaine multiple times and missed several probation office appointments. Despite warnings from the court, he continued to violate the terms of his supervised release, leading to his arrest in November. In January 2022, a revocation hearing was held due to multiple violations, including drug and alcohol use and failures to report to probation office appointments.The District Court for the District of Maine held a final revocation hearing in February 2023. The court calculated a guideline sentencing range of four to ten months, with thirty months of supervised release. However, the government advocated for an above-guidelines sentence of eighteen months' incarceration with no supervised release to follow, arguing that Centariczki had received multiple chances to seek drug treatment and yet continued to violate the terms of his probation. The court agreed and sentenced Centariczki to eighteen months' incarceration with no supervised release to follow.Centariczki appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, arguing that his sentence was substantively unreasonable because the district court lacked a sufficiently above-guidelines plausible rationale for imposing an eighteen-month sentence. The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the district court's rationale was plausible and its sentence was reasonable. The court noted that Centariczki's repeated violations of his supervised release terms and the multiple second chances afforded to him by the court and probation officer justified the above-guidelines sentence. The court affirmed the district court's decision. View "US v. Centariczki" on Justia Law

The case involves Caitlin Corrigan, a graduate student at Boston University (BU), who sued the university under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) for implementing a mandatory COVID-19 testing program. Corrigan claimed that due to a chronic medical condition, she could not comply with the program and that requiring her compliance would violate the ADA. BU rejected her proposed exemption, leading to her suspension for the fall semester. However, before the district court could reach the merits of Corrigan's claims, BU ended its mandatory testing program, leading the court to dismiss Corrigan's suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that it had become moot.BU moved to dismiss Corrigan's suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and the district court granted the motion, applying mootness principles. The court determined that since BU had ended its mandatory testing program, an order requiring BU to provide Corrigan with a reasonable accommodation to the program would have no effect. The court also found that Corrigan's claim was not inherently transitory and that BU was unlikely to subject Corrigan to mandatory testing again. The court held that the monetary relief that Corrigan sought was legally insufficient to support a claim of jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court concluded that the district court appropriately applied mootness principles to dismiss Corrigan's suit and that Corrigan had not shown that her case comes within an applicable exception to those mootness principles. The court rejected Corrigan's arguments that the district court misread the mootness exceptions, misconstrued the facts, and ignored the import of the ADA's scheme for providing prospective relief. View "Corrigan v. Boston University" on Justia Law

The case involves Francis M. Reynolds, who was convicted of three counts of obstruction of a United States Securities and Exchange Commission proceeding and one count of securities fraud. The District Court sentenced him to seven years of imprisonment plus three years of supervised release, ordered him to pay restitution to the victims of his fraud in the amount of $7,551,757, a special assessment of $400, and to forfeit $280,000 to the United States. Reynolds appealed his conviction, but he died while the appeal was pending.Reynolds was convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. He appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. While the appeal was pending, Reynolds died. The government suggested that the court should either dismiss the appeal as moot or follow the practice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts and dismiss the appeal as moot while instructing the District Court to add a notation in the record.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit had to decide whether to apply the doctrine of abatement ab initio, which holds that when a criminal defendant dies during the pendency of a direct appeal from his conviction, his death abates not only the appeal but also all proceedings had in the prosecution from its inception. The court decided to apply the doctrine, aligning itself with other federal courts of appeals and its own past decisions. The court dismissed the appeal and remanded the case to the District Court to vacate the convictions and dismiss the indictment. The court also instructed the District Court to vacate the orders of restitution and criminal forfeiture that were imposed in this case, as well as the special assessment. View "United States v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

Frederic P. Zotos, an attorney residing in Cohasset, Massachusetts, filed a qui tam complaint against the Town of Hingham and several of its officials. Zotos alleged that the town and its officials posted speed limit signs and advisory speed plaques that did not comply with applicable federal and state laws and regulations. He further claimed that the town applied for and received reimbursements for these signs and plaques from both the federal government and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Zotos asserted that the town fraudulently induced the federal government to pay it roughly $3,300,000 and the Commonwealth to pay it approximately $7,300,000.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed Zotos's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court concluded that the qui tam action was not barred by either claim or issue preclusion. However, it found that Zotos's claims fell short of the False Claims Act (FCA) and Massachusetts False Claims Act's (MFCA) requirements. Specifically, it ruled that Zotos failed to sufficiently plead that the alleged misrepresentations were material to the federal government's and the Commonwealth's respective decisions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court found that Zotos's complaint did not adequately allege that the defendants' purported misrepresentations were material. It noted that the essence of the bargain under the Federal-Aid Highway Program (FAHP) and the Chapter 90 program was that the defendants incurred permissible costs on projects that were duly reimbursed. The court concluded that Zotos's allegations amounted to ancillary violations that, without more, were insufficient to establish materiality. View "United States ex rel. Zotos v. Town of Hingham" on Justia Law

The case involves John Michael Rathbun, who was convicted for creating a homemade firebomb and placing it near a Jewish living facility in Longmeadow, Massachusetts. The bomb was discovered and Rathbun was identified as a suspect when his blood was found on the device. He was charged with attempting to transport and receive an explosive device, attempting to damage and destroy buildings, vehicles, and real and personal property by fire and explosion, and making false statements during an interview. Rathbun appealed his conviction, arguing that the district court erred in admitting irrelevant, biased, and prejudicial testimonial evidence, and in allowing repeated references to inappropriate and highly charged religious topics.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the conviction. The court found that the testimonies of the government's witnesses were relevant and probative, and that the district court had taken reasonable steps to limit any potential prejudice. The court also rejected Rathbun's argument that the cumulative effect of the testimonies and the government's opening and closing arguments unfairly prejudiced him. The court concluded that the government's case against Rathbun was strong and that it was highly probable that the admission of the challenged evidence did not affect the jury's verdict. View "United States v. Rathbun" on Justia Law

In a case involving an Egyptian petitioner, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the denial of the petitioner's claim for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). The petitioner, a Coptic Christian and Egyptian citizen, claimed he experienced persecution based on his religion. He was beaten and subjected to demands for conversion to Islam after he refused to alter a sensitive medical test result relating to a Muslim religious leader's family.The Court found that the BIA failed to correctly apply the "one central reason" test for motive in asylum claims. The Court ruled that the petitioner's religion was at least one central reason for his persecution. The Court also held that the BIA applied the wrong standard of review to the IJ’s conclusion on the petitioner’s CAT claim.The Court, however, upheld the BIA's conclusion that the petitioner's experiences of verbal harassment and rock-throwing did not rise to the level of persecution. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion. View "Khalil v. Garland" on Justia Law

In the case at hand, the defendant, Christopher Condron, was convicted of wire fraud and conspiracy to defraud the United States by obtaining payment for false claims. He had been involved in submitting applications to the United States Department of the Treasury for grant money in connection with supposed renewable energy projects. The applications were submitted on behalf of four different companies, which were created under the name of his then-girlfriend, Jessica Metivier.Condron appealed his conviction on three main grounds: 1) He argued that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction on all counts. 2) He claimed that the government's argument and evidence at trial constructively amended, or at least prejudicially varied from, one of the wire fraud counts. 3) He contended that the district court abused its discretion when it limited his cross-examination of a key government witness.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit rejected all three arguments and affirmed Condron's conviction. It found that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction, that the government did not constructively amend or prejudicially vary from the indictment, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting Condron's cross-examination of a key government witness. View "US v. Condron" on Justia Law

In this appeal, a married couple, both visually impaired, sued Colony Insurance Company to recover for the injuries they suffered when the wife fell down a restaurant's stairs. The couple had previously sued the restaurant and its owner for negligence in a New Hampshire state court, resulting in a default judgment against the defendants.The couple then sought to collect the judgment amount from Colony, the restaurant's insurer, arguing that the insurer was obligated to pay under the restaurant's liability insurance policy. Colony denied the couple's claim, stating that it was not notified of the lawsuit against the restaurant "as soon as practicable," as required by the insurance policy. The couple contended that the insurance policy was compulsory under a City of Manchester ordinance, therefore the insurer could not deny the claim based on a breach of the notice provision in the policy.The District Court granted summary judgment to Colony, ruling that the insured had breached the insurance contract by failing to provide timely notice and that the compulsory insurance doctrine, which generally limits an insurer's defenses against an injured party's claim, did not apply. The couple appealed the decision, but the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the District Court's ruling.The Appeals Court held that, as a matter of law, the lack of timely notice constituted a breach of the insurance contract, thereby releasing Colony from payment. The court also agreed with the District Court's conclusion that the compulsory insurance doctrine did not apply to the case. The court noted that the doctrine has largely been applied in the context of automobile liability insurance and found no persuasive reason to extend it to this case. View "Jespersen v. Colony Insurance Company" on Justia Law